Linux* Stacks for Intel® Trust Domain Extension 1.0

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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>0.8</strong></td>
<td>Initial Release</td>
<td><strong>1st May 2023</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>0.9</strong></td>
<td>• Add the reference tool of check-tdx-host.sh</td>
<td><strong>27th May 2023</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Add chapter 4.2.5 Linux Runtime Measurement via IMA (Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture)</td>
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<td>• Add chapter 3.5 Full Disk Encryption</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Add chapter 4.4 Use Intel Project Amber</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Complete the incomplete steps for Secure boot</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Add chapter 6.3 Check Memory Encryption</td>
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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Intel® Trust Domain Extension (Intel® TDX) refers to an Intel technology that extends virtual machine extensions (VMX) and Intel® Total Memory Encryption – Multi-Key (Intel® TME-MK) with a new kind of virtual machine guest called a trust domain (TD). A TD runs in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including the hosting virtual machine monitor (VMM) [1].

The white paper or specifications for Intel TDX can be found at Intel® Trust Domain Extensions, the major components’ interfaces are defined in the specifications in Figure 2 Intel TDX Component Interfaces.
Linux* Stacks for Intel® TDX is an end-to-end hypervisor cloud stack including the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS) components to produce the following minimal use cases:

- Launch Intel® TDX guest VM to run general computing workloads
- Do launch-time measurement within the Intel® TDX guest VM
- Do runtime attestation with the quote generated by Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX)-based quote generation service (QGS) on the IaaS host
The open-source code for Linux Stack for Intel TDX can be found at https://github.com/intel/tdx-tools.

NOTE: tdx-tools has multiples release tags. Please make sure to use the correct tag which matches the release version. Release tag and kernel version mapping can be found in tdx-tools wiki.

This document introduces:

- The deployment, cloud stack test, and other common uses for those who want to validate confidential workloads or tune performance.
- The debug and development methods for those who want to integrate stack for their IaaS/PaaS framework.
# 1.2 Terminology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>Authenticated Code Module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFV</td>
<td>Configuration Firmware Volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMR</td>
<td>Convertible Memory Ranges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLD</td>
<td>Complex Programmable Logic Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRB</td>
<td>Customer Reference Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAP</td>
<td>Data Center Attestation Primitives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMM</td>
<td>Dual In-line Memory Module</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECC</td>
<td>Error Correction Code memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>EFI System Partition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVA</td>
<td>Guest Virtual Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVC</td>
<td>Hypervisor Virtual Console</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBV</td>
<td>Independent BIOS Vendor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel SGX</td>
<td>Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel TDX</td>
<td>Intel® Trust Domain Extension (Intel® TDX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIV server</td>
<td>Live server is used for attestation with production CPU SKUs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUKS</td>
<td>Linux Unified Key Setup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRTD</td>
<td>Measurement of Trust Domain Firmware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVMF</td>
<td>Opensource Virtual Machine Firmware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Provisioning Certification Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCCS</td>
<td>Provisioning Certificate Caching Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QMP</td>
<td>QEMU Monitor Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTMR</td>
<td>Runtime Measurement Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBX server</td>
<td>Sandbox server is used for attestation with pre-production CPU SKUs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAM</td>
<td>Secure Arbitration Mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVN</td>
<td>Security Version Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCB</td>
<td>Trusted-Computing Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDVF</td>
<td>Trusted Domain Virtual Firmware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDVM</td>
<td>A TD guest VM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEE</td>
<td>Trusted Execution Environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 Install

2.1 Hardware

Linux Stack for Intel TDX needs the following hardware support that enables Intel TDX:

- CPU Processor SKU. Contact Intel sales rep for details.
- Board configurations via hardware jumper or CPLD (complex programmable logic device). Contact your ODM/OEM vendor.
- DDR5 DIMM with the type of 10 × 4 ECC (error correction code memory)
- DDR5 RDIMMs with integrity protection.
- DIMM (Dual in-line memory module) population. We recommend that all channel 0 slots be populated (8 DIMMs per socket) at least. DIMM population must be symmetric across IMCs (integrated memory controller).

![Diagram of DIMM Population for Intel TDX](image)

**Figure 4 8+0 DIMM Population for Intel TDX**

Intel TDX also supports the full DIMM population 16+0 as the follows:
2.2 BIOS

BIOS configurations are needed to support Intel TDX. Contact an Intel sales representee or IBV (independent BIOS vendor) for details. The following settings are examples for reference:
Figure 6 BIOS settings for Intel TDX

Please see the explanations in below table

Table 1 Intel TDX BIOS Configurations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BIOS Setting</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Volatile Memory = 1LM</strong></td>
<td>Intel TDX and CMR (Convertible Memory Ranges) logical integrity, isolation, and cryptographic integrity are only available with directly attached DDR5 memory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Memory Encryption (Intel TME) = Enable</strong></td>
<td>Intel TDX technology depends on Intel® Total Memory Encryption (Intel® TME).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Memory Encryption (Intel TME) Bypass = Auto</strong></td>
<td>4th generation Intel Xeon Scalable processors introduce an Intel TME bypass mode to allow memory outside of Intel TME multi-tenant virtual machines, Intel SGX enclaves, and Intel TDX trust domains to be unencrypted to improve the performance of nonconfidential software.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Memory Encryption Multi-Tenant (TME-MT) = Enable</strong></td>
<td>128 Intel TME – Multi-Tenant encryption keys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Memory Integrity = Disable</strong></td>
<td>4th generation Intel Xeon Scalable processor E-stepping does not support Intel TDX-CI, but only supports Intel TDX-LI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intel TDX = Enable</strong></td>
<td>Intel TDX should be enabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TDX Key Split = &lt;Non-zero Value)</strong></td>
<td>Keys split between Intel TME multi-tenant and Intel TDX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Software Guard Extension = Enable</strong></td>
<td>Intel TDX depends on Intel SGX technology for hardware TCB and remote attestation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The configuration or the menus might be different on your BIOS. Contact the IBV or OEM/ODM for the correct settings.*
## 2.3 Components

Linux Stack for Intel TDX is a vertical end-to-end stack including a series of components, which are listed in Table 2 Linux Stack for Intel TDX Components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intel TDX SEAM Module</td>
<td>An attested software module running in SEAM Root Mode.</td>
<td>Intel Trust Domain Extensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAM Loader</td>
<td>A SEAM module intended to install an Intel TDX module into SEAM range.</td>
<td>Intel Trust Domain Extensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel TDX Host Kernel</td>
<td>The host kernel with Intel TDX patches being upstreamed.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm">https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel TDX Qemu</td>
<td>QEMU with Intel TDX patches being upstreamed.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx">https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel TDX Libvirt</td>
<td>Libvirt with Intel TDX patches being upstreamed.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/intel/libvirt-tdx/tree/for_qemu_upstream">https://github.com/intel/libvirt-tdx/tree/for_qemu_upstream</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDVF</td>
<td>Virtual firmware (aka OVMF) with Intel TDX features already upstreamed.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/tianocore/edk2">https://github.com/tianocore/edk2</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCAP</td>
<td>Intel SGX-based DCAP (data center attestation primitives) for the platform certificate after registration.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives">https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QGS</td>
<td>QGS provides the functionality of Intel TDX quote generation within an Intel SGX-based quote enclave. It is part of the DCAP running on the IaaS host or legacy VM.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives">https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel TDX Guest Kernel</td>
<td>The guest kernel with Intel TDX patches being upstreamed.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest-upstream">https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest-upstream</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grub2</td>
<td>The bootloader grub2 with Intel TDX patches already upstreamed.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/intel/grub-tdx/tree/2.06-upstream-v4">https://github.com/intel/grub-tdx/tree/2.06-upstream-v4</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intel TDX Attestation Agent</td>
<td>A sample Intel TDX attestation agent to call TDVMCALL.getQuote(). It is part of DCAP.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives">https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PyTdxMeasure</td>
<td>A Python measurement library that dumps RTMR, the CCEL ACPI table, and verifies the RTMR via replaying the TD event log.</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/intel/tdx-tools">https://github.com/intel/tdx-tools</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Some of the components have completed patch upstreaming such as Grub, Shim, and TDVF, while others are still in progress.

### 2.4 Building Stacks

For an end-to-end stack setup and validation, tdx-tools provides downstream patches and a build tool to construct the whole stack in a few simple steps.

*Note: Please make sure to use the correct tag which matches the release version so that the tools can work with different Intel TDX kernel and Intel TDX QEMU versions.*

The supported distros’ versions are as follows for both host and guest packages:

- RHEL 8.x (will uses the latest RHEL 8.x version)
- Ubuntu 22.04

![Figure 7 End-to-End Host and Guest Stack for Linux and Intel TDX](image)

The end-to-end stack building includes two steps:
• Step 1: Build packages
• Step 2: Create guest image

2.4.1 Build Packages

A build.sh script is provided by tdx-tools to download upstream source, apply Intel TDX patches from the directory `<build>/common`, and do package building via OS packaging tool (such as rpmbuild for RHEL) and Debian for Ubuntu.

*Note: When obtaining tdx-tools, please make sure to use the correct tag which matches the release version.*

![Build process for Intel TDX packages](image)

The kernel config is provided in the kernel package directory with Intel TDX configurations, such as `build/rhel-8/intel-mvp-tdx-kernel/tdx-kernel.spec` for the RHEL-8 distro. All kernel configurations have been optimized for performance.

After the packages have been built successfully, two repositories are generated. One is the host repository, which includes the Intel TDX host kernel, Intel TDX Qemu, Intel TDX Libvirt, and TDVF. The other repository is the guest repository with the Intel TDX guest kernel, grub2, and shim.

2.4.2 Create Guest Image

As with non-confidential virtual machines, the Intel TDX virtual machine requires guest images with the Intel TDX guest kernel. Also, the grub2 and shim packages are required for grub boot and secure boot.
The Intel TDX virtual machine needs an EFI guest image to be booted by EFI BIOS TDVF (aka Intel TDX enabled OVMF).

- Some distros provide EFI enabled guest/cloud images, such as https://cloud-images.ubuntu.com/ for Ubuntu, so you just need to install the guest kernel and bootloaders (shim/grub) into the existing Ubuntu cloud image.
- If the default distro cloud image does not support an EFI schema, tdx-tools provides the tool, such as using build/rhel-8/guest-image/create-efi-img.sh to create the RHEL EFI guest image via the kickstart\(^1\) tool.

**NOTE: When obtaining tdx-tools, please make sure to use the correct tag which matches the release version.**

Based on the EFI guest image downloaded from the distro portal or created by create-efi-guest.sh, use tdx-guest-stack.sh to install the binary packages for Intel TDX guest kernel and bootloaders (shim and grub) into the guest image.

![Figure 9 Create Intel TDX guest image](image)

The example steps are shown as below:

- For RHEL8.x

```bash
$ # Prerequisite: build the RHEL packages via build-repo.sh
$ cd build/rhel-8/guest-image
$
$ # Create the EFI guest image from via kickstart scripts
$ ./create-efi-img.sh
$
$ # Install additional packages into guest image
```

\(^1\) [https://linuxhint.com/beginners-kickstart/](https://linuxhint.com/beginners-kickstart/)
2.5 Install IaaS Host

Perform the following steps to deploy the packages on IaaS host.

NOTE: Please disable Intel TDX in the BIOS to install Intel TDX packages. Because before installing Intel TDX host kernel, the distro default kernel may unintentionally cleanup MTRR (memory type range register) for Intel TDX memory range, which causes an MCHECK error. After Intel TDX packages have been installed and please set the Intel TDX kernel as the default one in grub boot menu, and reboot into BIOS to enable Intel TDX again.

2.5.1 Install Packages

For RHEL 8.x host

- Move the generated host repo to a directory that will be used in the repo file.

```
$ sudo mkdir -p /srv/
$ sudo mv <the generated repo directory> /srv/tdx-host
```

- Set up the host repository. Generate the file /etc/yum.repos.d/tdx-host-local.repo and add the following content.

```
$ vi /etc/yum.repos.d/tdx-host-local.repo
[tdx-host-local]
name=tdx-host-local
baseurl=file:///srv/tdx-host
enabled=1
gpgcheck=0
module_hotfixes=true
```

- Add the EPEL repo. It provides the packages of capstone and libcapstone required by Intel TDX Qemu.

```
```

- Install the host packages.
$ sudo dnf install intel-mvp-tdx-kernel intel-mvp-tdx-qemu-kvm intel-mvp-ovmf intel-mvp-tdx-libvirt

- If you get an error about qemu-kvm conflicts, remove the existing qemu-kvm package with the following command and then re-run the command above to install host packages.

$ sudo dnf remove qemu-kvm

For Ubuntu 22.04 host

- Install all Debian packages

$ cd host_repo
$ sudo apt -y --allow-downgrades install ./*/.deb

NOTE: please copy the Debian package file to a directory such as /tmp and then use the /tmp path in the apt command to install.

> Download is performed unsandboxed as root as file as file ... couldn't be accessed by user '_apt'. - pkgAcquire::Run (13: Permission denied)

2.5.2 Configure Grub

For RHEL 8.x

$ vi /etc/x/defaulx/grub

# Add "numa_balancing=disable" in GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX=".. numa_balancing=disable"

$ sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/efi/EFI/redhat/grub.cfg

For Ubuntu 22.04

$ vi /etc/default/grub

# Add "numa_balancing=disable" in GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=".. numa_balancing=disable"

$ sudo update-grub

2.5.3 Set Default Kernel

For RHEL 8.x

$ ls /boot/vmlinuz* | grep <kernel-version>
For Ubuntu 22.04

$ grep -A100 submenu /boot/grub/grub.cfg | grep menuentry | grep <TDX kernel version>

$ # Use the string in above output, such as "gnulinux-6.2.0-mvp4v1+2-
$ # generic-advanced-34db9317-bf73-44c3-8425-2fa83446e8d5" in
$ # /etc/default/grub file as value of “GRUB_DEFAULT”

$ vi /etc/default/grub
GRUB_DEFAULT="gnulinux-6.2.0-mvp4v1+2-generic-advanced-34db9317-bf73-44c3-8425-
2fa83446e8d5"

$ sudo update-grub

2.5.4 Reboot with the Intel TDX kernel

After installing the Intel TDX kernel and host packages successfully, reboot the system into the BIOS menu to turn on the Intel TDX configurations; refer to chapter 2.2 BIOS. Intel TDX should be enabled in the subsequent boot into the Intel TDX kernel. Use the following approach to verify its status or the script of check-tdx-host.sh from tdx-tools:

- Check whether TDX Module is initialized. The expected output is “TDX module initialized”.

$ sudo dmesg | grep -i tdx
......
tdx: TDX module initialized.

- Check Intel TME enable status; expect a return code of 1.

$ sudo rdmsr -f 1:1 0x982

- Check Intel TME max keys.

$ sudo rdmsr -f 50:36 0x981

- Check the Intel SGX and MCHECK status, expecting a code of 0.

$ sudo rdmsr 0xa0
0

- Check the Intel TDX Status, expecting a code of 1.

$ sudo rdmsr -f 11:11 0x1401
- Check the number of Intel TDX keys
  $ sudo rdmsr -f 63:32 0x87

- Check the information for the Intel TDX SEAM module.
  $ cat /sys/firmware/tdx/tdx_module/*
3 Manage the TD guest

Like a normal virtual machine, a TD guest can be launched by QEMU via command line or orchestrated by Libvirt via XML templates. This chapter introduces how to manage the lifecycle of a TD guest for diverse boots such as secure boot, direct boot, and grub boot.

**NOTE:** Please make sure to use the correct tag of tdx-tools which matches the release version.

3.1 Overview

You can boot a TD guest either by using the QEMU command line or by using a Libvirt XML template and virsh commands. Libvirt translates the XML template to QEMU commands and calls qemu-kvm to complete the VM boot. Similarly, you can call qemu-kvm directly with parameters to boot a VM.

The following diagram illustrates the TD guest boot type and boot process.

The following table explains different boot types:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boot Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Difference from a non-confidential VM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Figure 10 TD Guest Boot Process*
| **Direct Boot** | Boot the guest by explicitly specifying kernel binary via qemu launching parameter “-kernel”, specifying the initrd binary via qemu launching parameter “-initrd”, specifying the kernel command via qemu launching parameter “-append”. Bootloaders, such as shim/grub are not involved in direct boot. | No differences on qemu launch parameters for confidential VM, but requires TDVF/OVMF to do measured boot and record the measurement into RTMR(Runtime Measurement Register) register |
| **Grub Boot** | Boot the guest without “-kernel” and “-append” in qemu launching params. The OVMF/TDVF search for and start the bootloader from ESP. | No differences on qemu launch parameters for confidential VM, but requires Intel TDX Grub2 to do measured boot and record the measurement into RTMR register |
| **Measured Boot** | It is the process of measuring and storing securely (i.e. using a TPM) the next stage object in the boot process by the UEFI BIOS, bootloader, kernel, etc. | The secure register is a PCR register in a trusted computing group (TCG)-defined trusted platform module (TPM), while is RTMR in Intel TDX SEAM module |
| **Secure Boot** | Secure boot is a security standard developed by members of the PC industry to help make sure that a device boot using only software that is trusted by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). The Secure boot certificate should be protected by measured boot. | The secure boot certificate can be enrolled in runtime of guest VM for non-confidential VM, while the secure boot must be enrolled in TDVF offline for the consistent measurement on MRTD (measurement of trust domain) |

The detail boot flow for different TD boot methods can be found in Figure 11. The detail boot flow for different TD boot...
Figure 11 The detail boot flow for different TD boot
3.2 Boot TD Guest

3.2.1 Launch via QEMU

Since the QEMU parameter list is quite long and complicated, tdx-tools provides the start-qemu.sh script to handle some parameters by default. It supports both direct boot and grub boot of TD guest. It also provides a few interactive parameters for you to meet customization requirement.

*Note: the parameters in “start-qemu.sh” may vary along with different Intel TDX kernel and Intel TDX QEMU versions. Please make sure to use the correct tag of tdx-tools which matches the release*

The start-qemu.sh script offers several parameters so you can boot TD guest on demand. The parameters are listed in Table 4 start-qemu.sh parameters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-i {image file}</td>
<td>Guest image file name and location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-k {kernel file}</td>
<td>Kernel binary name and location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-t [legacy</td>
<td>efi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-b [direct</td>
<td>grub]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-p {Monitor port}</td>
<td>Monitor port via telnet. Refer to the usage of QEMU Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-f {SSH Forward port}</td>
<td>Host port used for guest VM SSH forwarding. Refer to QEMU SSH port forwarding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-o {OVMF file}</td>
<td>BIOS firmware device file. OVMF/TDVF is used for “td” and “efi” VM type. “efi” is used for non-confidential VM, while “td” is used for TD VM guest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-m {MAC address}</td>
<td>MAC address of VM. If MAC address changes for a TD guest, RTMR value will change and Intel TDX measurement will fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-q [tdvmcall</td>
<td>vsock]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-c {number}</td>
<td>Number of vCPU. Default value is 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-r {root partition}</td>
<td>Root partition for direct boot, default is /dev/vda3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-e {extra kernel command}</td>
<td>Extra kernel command needed in VM boot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-v</td>
<td>Flag to enable vsock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-d</td>
<td>Flag to enable “debug=on” for GDB guest. Refer to chapter 6 Develop &amp; Debug</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
-s | Flag to use serial console instead of hypervisor virtual console (HVC).

-h | Show usage help

- Direct boot TD guest via QEMU command

This is an example of direct boot using start-qemu.sh. You need to provide the guest image and kernel image as shown. Direct boot is used by default, so it’s not required to use “-b direct”.

```
$ ./start-qemu.sh -i <guest image> -k <kernel binary>
```

- Grub boot TD guest via QEMU command

This is an example of grub boot using start-qemu.sh. You need to provide the guest image and specify to use grub boot via “-b grub”.

```
$ ./start-qemu.sh -i <guest image> -b grub
```

- Direct boot non-confidential guest via QEMU command

This is an example of direct boot non-TD guest using You need to provide the guest image and kernel image as shown. It also requires using "-t efi" to boot non-confidential guest via OVMF/TDVF or “-t legacy” to boot non-confidential guest via legacy SeaBIOS.

```
$ ./start-qemu.sh -i <guest image> -k <kernel image> -t efi
$ ./start-qemu.sh -i <guest image> -k <kernel image> -t legacy
```
3.2.2 Launch via Libvirt

Libvirt is a popular orchestrator to manage the VM guest via the virsh command. tools provides both direct boot and grub boot XML templates for TD guest at tdx-tools/doc/.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Template</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tdx_libvirt_direct.xml.template</td>
<td>TD guest direct boot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tdx_libvirt_grub.xml.template</td>
<td>TD guest grub boot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The templates may vary with a different kernel version or QEMU version. Please make sure to use the correct tag of tdx-tools which matches the release version.

To create the final VM’s XML from the template, you must update the XML template to refer to the guest image, kernel image, and OVMF binary:

- Update OVMF binary
  <loader>/path/to/OVMF.fd</loader>
- Update guest image
  <source file="/path/to/guest-image.qcow2"/>
- Update kernel image (This is not needed when using grub boot template)
  <kernel>/path/to/vmlinuz-jammy</kernel>

Unlike QEMU, Libvirt uses the concept of a domain to manage the VM lifecycle across reboot cycle. Libvirt distinguishes between two different types of domains: transient and persistent².

- Transient domains only exist until the domain is shut down or when the host server is restarted.
- Persistent domains last indefinitely.

This example uses a Transient domain to start TD guest:

```
$ virsh start tdx_libvirt_direct.xml
```

You can check whether a TD guest is running with the following command. It’s expected to see TD guest running.

² [https://wiki.libvirt.org/VM_lifecycle.html](https://wiki.libvirt.org/VM_lifecycle.html)
3.3 Use VirtIO Device

Within the Intel TDX guest, the drivers contribute 90% of threat attack surface. They access host-controlled PCI config space and perform MMIO and port IO. Refer to Figure 12 TDX Guest Attack Surface or detail threat analysis at [2].

Limit the set of drivers that are enabled in runtime for the TD guest kernel. By default, all PCI and ACPI bus drivers are blocked unless they are in the allow-list. The current default allow-list for the PCI bus is limited to the following VirtIO drivers:

- virtio_net
- virtio_console
- virtio_blk
- 9pnet_virtio
- virtio_vsock
Since most of the ACPI tables are not needed for an Intel TDX guest, the implemented ACPI table allow-list limits them to a small, predefined list with a possibility to pass additional tables via a command line option. The current allow-list is limited to the following tables:

- XSDT
- FACP
- DSDT
- FACS
- APIC
- SVKL
- CCEL

### 3.4 Secure Boot

The secure boot for TD guest is almost the same as a traditional non-confidential VM. The major difference is the OMVF.fd/TDVF.fd needs to be measured into MRTD statically. Since the EFI variable is read-only in runtime with TDX guest VM, it does not permit enrolling the secure boot key into the EFI variable FV (firmware volume) via a tool such as EnrollDefaultKey at runtime. Instead, a new tool ovmfkeyenroll from tdx-tools is developed to help enroll the secure boot certificate offline before measurement.

![Figure 13 Enable Secure Boot](image)

The steps of enrolling the secure boot key are as follows:
• Step 1: Generate customized secure boot keys and certificates, instead of using MSFT cert

```bash
#!/bin/bash
NAME="Test"
openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj "/CN=$NAME PK/" -keyout PK.key
   -out PK.crt -days 3650 -nodes -sha256
openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj "/CN=$NAME KEK/" -keyout KEK.key
   -out KEK.crt -days 3650 -nodes -sha256
openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -subj "/CN=$NAME DB/" -keyout DB.key
   -out DB.crt -days 3650 -nodes -sha256
openssl x509 -in PK.crt -out PK.cer -outform DER
openssl x509 -in KEK.crt -out KEK.cer -outform DER
openssl x509 -in DB.crt -out DB.cer -outform DER
GUID=$(python3 -c 'import uuid; print(str(uuid.uuid1()))')
echo $GUID > myGUID.txt
chmod 0600 *.key
```

Regarding the use of various digital certificates, you can refer to the following materials:
  o Managing EFI Boot Loaders for Linux: Controlling Secure Boot
  o UEFI Specification

• Step 2: Build and install ovmfkeyenroll tool, Refer to source
• Step 3: Enroll key into OVMF.fd (aka TDVF.fd)

```
$ ovmfkeyenroll -fd <absolute-path-to-OVMF.fd> \
   -pk <absolute-path-to>/PK.cer \
   -kek <absolute-path-to>/KEK.cer \
   -db <absolute-path-to>/DB.cer
```

**NOTE:** Replace GUID with content of myGUID.txt generated above.

• Step 4: Install signing tool
  o Build from source: sbsigntools
  o Use RPM or DEB packages built by third-party. For example

```
$ wget https://download.ib01.fedoraproject.org/pub/fedora/linux/releases/33/Everything/
x86_64/os/Packages/s/sbsigntools-0.9.4-2.fc33.x86_64.rpm
$ sudo rpm -ihvf sbsigntools-0.9.4-2.fc33.x86_64.rpm
```

• Step 5: Extract following components from the guest’s packages
  o shimx64.efi
  o mmx64.efi
  o grubx64.efi
  o fbx64.efi
  o guest kernel binary file like vmlinuz
• Step 6: Sign Shim/Grub/Kernel with customized secure boot key

```
sbsign --key <path-to>/DB.key --cert <path-to>/DB.crt --output shimx64-signed.efi shimx64.efi
```
NOTE: if the DB.key / DB.crt / file to be signed is not in the same directory, you need to use a relative address.

The get following files:

- shimx64-signed.efi
- mmx64-signed.efi
- grubx64-signed.efi
- fbx64-signed.efi
- vmlinuz-signed

- Step 7: Customize guest QCOW2 Image
  - Create the directories for mounting ESP and rootfs partitions:
    ```
    mkdir -p workspace/efi
    mkdir -p workspace/rootfs
    ```
  - Connect the QCOW2 image to /dev/nbdx:
    ```
    sudo modprobe nbd max_part=8
    sudo qemu-nbd --connect=/dev/nbd0 /path/of/td-guest.qcow2
    ```
  - Mount ESP and rootfs
    For RHEL 8.x:
    ```
    sudo mount /dev/nbd0p2 workspace/efi
    sudo mount /dev/nbd0p3 workspace/rootfs
    ```
    For Ubuntu 22.04:
    ```
    sudo mount /dev/nbd0p15 workspace/efi
    sudo mount /dev/nbd0p1 workspace/rootfs
    ```
  - Replace the files
    For RHEL 8.x:
    ```
    sudo cp /path/to/shimx64-signed.efi workspace/efi/EFI/BOOT/BOOTX64.EFI
    sudo cp /path/to/mmxx64-signed.efi workspace/efi/EFI/redhat/mmxx64.efi
    ```
version of the kernel sudo cp /path/to/vmlinuz-signed
workspace/rootfs/boot/vmlinuz-<kernel-version>

For Ubuntu 22.04:

sudo cp /path/to/shimx64-signed.efi workspace/efi/EFI/BOOT/shimx64.efi
sudo cp /path/to/fbx64-signed.efi workspace/efi/EFI/BOOT/fbx64.efi
sudo cp /path/to/mmx64-signed.efi workspace/efi/EFI/BOOT/mmx64.efi
sudo cp /path/to/grubx64-signed.efi workspace/efi/EFI/ubuntu/grubx64.efi

# please pay attention to replace the correct version of the kernel
cpu /path/to/vmlinuz-signed
workspace/rootfs/boot/vmlinuz-<kernel-version>

- Step 8: Unmount the ESP and rootfs partitions:
  For RHEL 8.x:

  ```
sudo mount /dev/nbd0p2 workspace/efi
sudo mount /dev/nbd0p3 workspace/rootfs
  ```

For Ubuntu 22.04:

  ```
sudo mount /dev/nbd0p15 workspace/efi
sudo mount /dev/nbd0p1 workspace/rootfs
  ```

- Step 9: Disconnect the QCOW2 image

  ```
sudo qemu-nbd --disconnect /dev/nbd0
  ```

Then use the modified OVMF.sb.fd and tdx-guest.sb.qcow2 to start TDVM, and verify whether the secure boot is enabled via dmesg log:

  ```
dmesg | grep -i "Secure Boot"
  ```

It expects to show "Secure Boot Enabled"

### 3.5 Full Disk Encryption

FDE (Full disk encryption) is a security method for protecting sensitive data by encrypting all data on a disk partition. In non-confidential VM, FDE is using LUKS (Linux Unified Key Setup) with user input disk encryption key. In confidential environment like Intel TDX, to achieve zero trust, the encryption key should be got from the replying party via remote attestation as Figure 14 Full Disk Encryption in TDX Guest.
The FDE can be done in OVMF at pre-boot stage or initrd at Linux early boot stage like Figure 14 Full Disk Encryption in TDX Guest, please refer the presentation “Secure Bootloader for Confidential Computing”.

3.5.1 Workflow

This section introduces a solution/implementation integrating FDE with Intel TDX. The workflow can be divided into 5 steps, including

1. Register key and keyid from the KBS.
2. Create an encrypted guest image with key retrieved in Step 1
3. Install FDE components in the encrypted guest image
4. Enroll necessary variables into OVMF
5. Launch a TDX guest based on the encrypted guest image and the OVMF

In Step 1, a pair of the key and the keyid should be registered in the KBS. Typically, the key will be used to encrypt the guest image, and the keyid will be treated as an identifier of the key in the KBS, which will be used in the decryption process. Given that KBS providers have different designs for their keys and keyids, it is
recommended to register the pair of the key and the keyid after consulting the KBS provider.

The Step 2, Step 3 create a FDE-enabled guest image. The tdx-tools provides an integrated script “tdx-tools/attestation/full-disk-encryption/tools/image/fde-image.sh” to complete the task. The key and the keyid is retrieved in Step 1 and the tdx-repo is built from the tdx-tools.

```bash
$ cd attestation/full-disk-encryption/tools/image
$ ./fde-image.sh -k ${key} -i ${keyid} -d ${tdx-repo}
```

In Step 4, several variables are enrolled in the OVMF. These variables, such as keyid, are retrieved by the fde-agent from the OVMF to help remote attestation and retrieve the key from the KBS. For example, assume that the keyid is saved in a json file. The python script “tdx-tools/attestation/full-disk-encryption/tools/image/enroll_vars.py” helps enroll the data.

```bash
$ cd attestation/full-disk-encryption/tools/image
$ cat userdata.txt
{
   "keyid":"sth"
}
$ NAME="KBSUserData"
$ GUID="732284dd-70c4-472a-aa45-1ffda02caf74"
$ DATA="userdata.txt"
$ python3 tools/image/enroll_vars.py -i OVMF.fd -o OVMF.fd -n $NAME -g $GUID -d $DATA
```

In Step 5, a TDX guest is launched from the encrypted guest image. The script “tdx-tools/start-qemu.sh” can launch it.

```bash
$ OVMF_PATH=/path/to/OVMF
$ IMAGE_PATH=/path/to/image
$ start-qemu.sh \  
  -b grub \ 
  -q tdvmcall \ 
  -o ${OVMF_PATH} \ 
  -i ${IMAGE_PATH}
```

The detail steps are described in tdx-tools/doc/full_disk_encryption.md.

### 3.5.2 Prepare Encryption Image

It is complicated to create an encrypted guest image in Step 2 and Step 3. In Step 2, an empty image is created firstly. The image will be partitioned into several volumes
and the root filesystem partition is encrypted with the key in actual. Then the rootfs is copy to the root filesystem partition.

In the Step 3, a binary named by the fde-agent and its related configuration need to be installed into the initrd. Besides, a parameter “cryptdevice=${root-enc}” that specifies the encrypted root partition, is appended in the kernel cmdline to enable the FDE.

More details are described in the tdx-tools/ attestation/full-disk-encryption/README.md.
4 Measurement & Attestation

4.1 TEE, TCB, Quote

Typically, a TEE can provide evidence or measurements of its origin and current state so that the evidence can be verified by another party and, programmatically or manually, it can decide whether to trust code running in the TEE. It is typically important that such evidence is signed by hardware that can be vouched for by a manufacturer, so that the party checking the evidence has strong assurances that it was not generated by malware or other unauthorized parties. [3] The remote party allows sending the secret or key to the TEE environment after successfully verifying the evidence.

The trusted computing base (TCB) refers to all of a system's hardware, firmware, and software components that provide a secure environment. For a confidential VM, it includes hardware information such as CPU, SEAM firmware, and guest components such as OVMF, bootloader (shim/grub), and kernel. The other host software such as QEMU VMM and Orchestrator Libvirt are out of TCB.

The hash-chained measurement on TCB will be extended to some secure registers such as TPM PCR (platform configuration register). The values from several secure registers construct to a report and are finally signed to be a quote by an attestation key.

Figure 15 Measurement and Attestation for TEE
4.2 TDX Measurement

4.2.1 TD Report

The API TDG.MR.REPORT in the Intel TDX SEAM module creates a TDREPORT_STRUCT structure\(^3\) containing the TD measurements, initial configuration of the TD that was locked at finalization (TDH.MR.FINALIZE), the Intel TDX module measurements, and the REPORTDATA value [1]:

- The measurement of SEAM module is recorded in the field MRSEAM.
- The measurement of TDVF/OVMF is record in the field MRTD.
- The measurement of TD-Hob, ACPI is record in the RTMR [0].
- The measurement of bootloaders like grub/shim is recorded in the field RTMR [1].
- The measurement of kernel and initrd is recorded in the field RTMR [2].

NOTE: for direct boot, there is no bootloader, so the measurement of kernel is recorded in the field RTMR [1].

4.2.2 MRTD and RTMR

There are two types of measurement registers – MRTD and RTMR for Intel TDX:

---

\(^3\) [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/IndustryStandard/Tdx.h](https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/IndustryStandard/Tdx.h)
• MRTD (TD measurement register) provides static measurement of TD build process and the initial contents of TD
• RTMR (runtime measurement register) is an array of general-purpose measurement registers to Intel TDX software to enable measuring additional logic and data loaded into the TD at runtime. As designed, RTMR can be used by the guest TD software to measure boot process.

There are 4 RTMR registers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Register</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Measured by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RTMR [0]</td>
<td>Static configuration (CFV); Dynamic Configuration (TD HOB, ACPI)</td>
<td>TDVF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTMR [1]</td>
<td>PCI option ROM, OS loader, OS kernel, initrd, GPT, boot variable, boot parameter</td>
<td>TDVF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTMR [2]</td>
<td>TD OS App</td>
<td>OS applications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTMR [3]</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.2.3 Pre-Boot Measurement**

The pre-boot environment before the kernel includes the TDVF/OVMF phase of the bootloader phase (shim and grub). The whole boot chain will be measured into RTMR via EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL⁴.

⁴ [https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h](https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h)
Similar to TCG event log [4], EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL logs the events into ACPI table CCEL \(^5\) and the measurement hash is extended to the corresponding RTMR register. The event logs in CCEL table can be replayed within TD guest to verify the RTMR value.

### 4.2.4 PyTdxMeasure Tool

**PyTdxMeasure** intdx-tools provides a Python library and utilities for TD measurement that can be used by tenant workload, attestation agent, or validation tools:

- Get RTMR value from TDREPORT via Linux attestation driver.
- Get the full TD event log from CCEL ACPI table.
- Verify value of RTMR by replaying event logs.

Here are step by step instructions to use PyTdxMeasure:

Intel TDX measurement depends on Intel TDX grub2 and shim. Make sure Linux Stack for Intel TDX grub2 and shim are installed in the guest VM image before running measurement tool.

- Install

```bash
$ python3 -m pip install pytdxmeasure
```

---

5. [https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.5/05_ACPI_Software_Programming_Model.html#cc-event-log-acpi-table](https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.5/05_ACPI_Software_Programming_Model.html#cc-event-log-acpi-table)
• Run
  
  o Get Event Log.
  
  $./tdx_eventlogs
  
  Refer to the example outputs at measurement log for grub boot and measurement log for direct boot
  
  o Get TDREPORT, which includes value of RTMR.
  
  $./tdx_tdreport
  
  o Verify RTMR.
  
  $./tdx_verify_rtmr
  
  The tool will compare RTMR value from TDREPORT and RTMR value replayed via event log. The two values are expected to be identical, which means the measured contents are not tampered with.

4.2.5 Linux Runtime Measurement

Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) is the Linux kernel integrity subsystem to detect if files have been accidentally or maliciously altered, both remotely and locally. Currently IMA maintains the runtime measurement list if anchored in a hardware Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to make the measured hashes of files immutable. It also supports the appraise mechanism to enforce local file integrity by appraising the measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute.

Extra kernel changes have been introduced to enable IMA in TD guest and maintain the runtime measurement list inside RTMR [2].

![Figure 17 Enable IMA extend hash to RTMR](image-url)
Different configurations (kernel command line) can be applied to define the scope to be measured. Available options include:

- “ima_hash=sha384”: Enable measurement against boot aggregates, which covers firmware, boot loader, kernel command line and etc.
- “ima_hash=sha384 ima_policy=critical_data”: Enable measurements against boot aggregates and kernel integrity critical data.
- “ima_hash=sha384 ima_policy=tcb”: Enable measurements against all programs executed, files mmap’d for execution, and all files opened with the read mode bit set by either the effective uid (euid=0) or uid=0.

Custom policies can be set by user to define the scope to be measured. For more details, please refer to the IMA documentations.

Here are sample instructions to enable and validate this feature in TD guest:

- Sample configuration to start up the TD VM

  ```
  $ ./start-qemu.sh -k <path-to-kernel> -i <path-to-image> -e "ima_hash=sha384 ima_policy=critical_data"
  ```

- Run
  - Get IMA measurement count.

  ```
  $ cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/runtime_measurements_count
  ```

  - Get full IMA measurement list stored inside kernel securityfs.

  ```
  $ cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
  ```

  - Verify RTMR within TDREPORT by using the PyTdxMeasure Tool.

  ```
  $ cd tdx-tools/attestation/pytdxmeasure
  $ ./tdx_tdreport
  ```

User can find the measurements extended in RTMR [3] inside the TDREPORT. TPM PCR Calculator (available in Microsoft Store) can be used to replay the result with the ASCII measurements that fetched inside kernel security FS.

### 4.3 Attestation
4.3.1 Overview

Intel TDX remote attestation demonstrates applications that are running securely on a given trusted environment (TD guest) to a relying party. This increases the confidence of a remote party that the software is running inside a TD on a genuine Intel TDX system at a given security level, which is also referenced as the TCB version. The TDX attestation reuses Intel SGX infrastructure to provide attestation to a given measurement. It is based on TD Quote, which is the signed TD Report in TD Quoting Enclave [1].

![Figure 18 Intel TDX Attestation Flow](image)

- Step 1: A TD receives an attestation request from an off-platform challenger.
- Step 2: The TD then requests an Intel TDX module to provide the TD a report.
- Step 3,4: The Intel TDX module invokes the SEAMREPORT instruction to request the CPU generate a Report structure, including the TD-provided data, the measurements of the TD as maintained by the module, and SVNs (security version number) of all elements in the TDX TCB.
- Step 5,6: The TD requests the VMM converts the report into a Quote for remote attestation.
- Step 7,8,9: The TD-quoting enclave then verifies the MAC on the report using EVERIFYREPORT2 and converts the report, if verified, into a Quote by signing the report using the TD’s asymmetric-attestation key.
- Step 10: The Quote is returned to the challenger.
- Step 11, 12: The challenger uses an attestation-verification service to perform quote verification.

Linux Stack for Intel TDX provides end-to-end Intel TDX attestation capability by integrating the Intel® Software Guard Extensions Data Center Attestation Primitives® (Intel® SGX DCAP). In this section, it will introduce how to run Intel TDX remote attestation.

4.3.2 Set Up DCAP Repo

Before running the steps, download DCAP from https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/latest/dcap-latest/linux/ based on the OS distro.

This example shows how to set up the package repository on an Intel TDX host with either Ubuntu 22.04 or RHEL 8.x.

Get the latest instruction from https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/latest/dcap-latest/linux/docs/ or https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives

1. Ubuntu 22.04

```bash
$ tar zxvf <sgx_debian_local_repo file name>.tar.gz
$ mv sgx_debian_local_repo /srv/sgx_debian_local_repo

# Set up local Debian repository
$ cat <<EOF >> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/sgx_debian_local_repo.list
deb [trusted=yes arch=amd64] file:/srv/sgx_debian_local_repo jammy main
EOF

$ sudo apt update
$ sudo apt install -y gcc make tar

# Install latest nodejs, version 18 shown below is an example
$ curl -sL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_18.x -o nodesource_setup.sh
$ sudo bash nodesource_setup.sh sudo apt-get install -y nodejs
```

2. RHEL 8.x

```bash
$ sudo su cd /srv/
$ tar zxvf <sgx_rpm_local_repo file name>.tar.gz
$ mv sgx_rpm_local_repo /srv/sgx_rpm_local_repo

# Set up local RPM repository
$ cat <<EOF >> /etc/yum.repos.d/tdx-attestation.repo
tdx-attestation-local[
name=tdx-attestation-local
baseurl=file://srv/sgx_rpm_local_repo
EOF
```
4.3.3 Set Up PCCS

Intel provides a reference provisioning certification caching service (PCCS) to enable Intel SGX attestation runtime workloads without a dependence on the Intel services. PCCS is a reference caching server to allow a CSP or a data center to cache PCK Certificates and other endorsements from the Intel® Software Guard Extensions Provisioning Certification Service (Intel® SGX Provisioning Certification Service) in their local network. You’ll need to set up PCCS for remote attestation purpose.

Figure 9 Set up PCCS

1. Obtain a provisioning API key for PCCS RESTful API request
Goto https://api.portal.trustedservices.intel.com/provisioning-certification and click 'Subscribe'. An API key will be generated. Be sure to keep the API key for future use.

2. Install package sgx-dcap-pccs as following steps:
   
o Ubuntu 22.04
   
   $ sudo apt update
   $ sudo apt install -y --no-install-recommends sgx-dcap-pccs
   $ cd /opt/intel/sgx-dcap-pccs
   $ sudo -u pccs ./install.sh

   o RHEL 8.x
   
   $ sudo dnf install -y sgx-dcap-pccs
   $ cd /opt/intel/sgx-dcap-pccs
   $ sudo -u pccs ./install.sh

   During the installation, when prompted for the API key and password, use the API key from the previous step. Other steps can accept default value when prompted.
   After the installation is completes successfully, make sure the PCCS is configured to use v4 API. Check “uri” in configuration file /opt/intel/sgx-dcap-pccs/config/default.json:

   "uri": "https://api.trustedservices.intel.com/sgx/certification/v4/"

3. Restart PCCS

   $ sudo systemctl restart pccs

   *Note: Please Delete the previously created database before restarting the PCCS service.*

   $ sudo rm -rf /opt/intel/sgx-dcap-pccs/pckcache.db
   $ sudo systemctl restart pccs
   $ sudo systemctl status pccs

4. Check PCCS service log

   - You can check PCCS service log by running the following command.

   $ journalctl -u pccs -f
4.3.4 Set Up DCAP on Host

This section introduces the installation of Quote Generation Service from DCAP and performs Intel SGX platform registration.

1. Install the Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK for Linux* OS (Intel® SGX SDK for Linux* OS) to the folder /opt/intel/
   
   - Ubuntu 22.04 host
     
     ```
     $ sudo ./sgx_linux_x64_sdk_2.18.100.4-u2204.bin
     ```
   
   - RHEL 8.x host
     
     ```
     $ sudo ./sgx_linux_x64_sdk_2.18.100.4.bin
     ```

2. Install QGS and QPL packages on the host

   - Ubuntu 22.04 host
     
     ```
     $ sudo apt install -y --no-install-recommends tdx-qgs libsgx-dcap-default-qpl
     ```
   
   - RHEL 8.x host
     
     ```
     $ sudo dnf install -y tdx-qgs libsgx-dcap-default-qpl
     ```

   Modify the configuration file: /etc/sgx_default_qcnl.conf and use the following content.

   ```
   // PCCS server address
   ```
3. Install PCKIDRetrievalTool
   - Ubuntu 22.04 host
     ```
     $ sudo apt install -y sgx-pck-id-retrieval-tool
     ```
   - For RHEL 8.* host, run below commands:
     ```
     $ sudo dnf install -y sgx-pck-id-retrieval-tool
     ```

   **NOTE:** the reported version of PCKIDRetrievalTool may be different.

4. Modify the configuration file `/opt/intel/sgx-pck-id-retrieval-tool/network_setting.conf` with the following content.

   ```
   # if using localhost as pccs
   USE_SECURE_CERT=FALSE
   ```

5. Do SGX platform Registration via PCKIDRetrievalTool
   ```
   $ sudo sh -c "./PCKIDRetrievalTool"
   ```

   The expected response is as follows. The reported version may be different.

   **Intel® Software Guard Extensions PCK Cert ID Retrieval Tool Version 1.14.100.3**
   Registration status has been set to completed status. pckid_retrieval.csv has been generated successfully!

   **NOTE:** If it returns a message like "Platform Manifest not available", you may need to perform SGX Factory Reset in BIOS and run PCKIDRetrievalTool again.

### 4.3.5 Generate Quote

This section introduces the quote generation steps including launching TDX with quote generation support and generating a quote within the TDX guest.
4.3.5.1 Launch TD with Quote Generation Support

There are two ways to run quote generation:

**Approach 1:** Get quote via vsock call from the user space within Intel TDX guest to QGS directly

**Approach 2:** Get quote via TDG.VP.VMCALL.GETQUOTE via /dev/tdx-guest driver
• Approach 1: Get quote via vsoc k call from the user space within TD guest to QGS directly
  o If launched via QEMU, add the following parameter
  
  ```
  device_vhost-vsock-pci,guest_cid=3
  ```
  o If launched via libvirt, add following fields in XML
  
  ```
  <vsock model='virtio'>
    <cid auto='yes' address='3'/>
    <address type='pci' domain='0x0000' bus='0x05' slot='0x00' function='0x0'/>
  </vsock>
  ```

• Approach 2: Get quote via TDG.VP.VMCALL.GETQUOTE
  o If launched via QEMU, add “quote-generation-service=vsock:2:4050” in parameter -object
  
  ```
  -object_tdx-guest,sept-ve-disable,tdx,quote-generation-service=vsock:2:4050
  ```
  o If launched via libvirt, add following fields in XML
  
  ```
  <launchSecurity type='tdx'>
    ...
    <Quote-Generation-Service>vsock:2:4050</Quote-Generation-Service>
  </launchSecurity>
  ```

• Within TD guest, create file at /etc/tdx-attest.conf with the following content:
  
  ```
  port=4050
  ```

**4.3.5.2 Generate Quote within Intel TDX Guest**

1. Set up the package repository in TD guest same as 4.3.2 Set Up DCAP
   - Install libtdx-attest, libtdx-attest-dev
     o For Ubuntu 22.04
     ```
     $ sudo apt install -y libtdx-attest libtdx-attest-dev
     ```
     o For RHEL 8.x
     ```
     $ sudo dnf install -y libtdx-attest libtdx-attest-devel
     ```
   2. Build quote generation sample
     ```
     $ cd /opt/intel/tdx-quote-generation-sample/
     $ make clean
     $ make
     ```
   3. Generate quote and quote.dat will be generated.
     ```
     $ ./test_tdx_attest
     ```
4.3.6 Verify Quote

After Quote is generated, you can use sample Quote verification application to verify the Quote.

1. Install the Quote verification libraries:
   - For Ubuntu 22.04
     
     ```bash
     $ sudo apt install -y libsgx-dcap-quote-verify
     $ sudo apt install -y libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-dev
     $ sudo apt install -y libsgx-ae-qve
     ```
   - For RHEL 8.x
     
     ```bash
     $ sudo dnf install -y libsgx-dcap-quote-verify
     $ sudo dnf install -y libsgx-dcap-quote-verify-devel
     $ sudo dnf install -y libsgx-ae-qve
     ```

2. Copy quote.dat from TDVM

   Use `scp` or `virt_copy_out` to copy the quote from TDVM

   ```bash
   $ virt-copy-out -a <image_name> <directory_in_TDVM_contains_quote.dat> <a_host_directory>
   ```
3. Build and run sample application verifying the generated quote located at `PATH`:

```bash
$ git clone https://github.com/intel/SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives.git
$ git checkout 6f77ba8f153e7cecd8da3cf65a0f1bb9cc1f638
$ cd SGXDataCenterAttestationPrimitives/SampleCode/TDQuoteVerificationSample
$ make DEBUG=1
$.app -quote <PATH>/quote.dat
```

### 4.4 Use Intel Project Amber

Intel Project Amber is Intel’s first step in creating a new multi-cloud, multi-TEE service for third-party attestation and will drive forward adoption of confidential computing for the broader industry. Please refer [Project Amber](https://github.com/intel/amber-client) for more details. This section introduces how to install Amber client to access services.

#### 4.4.1 Overview

Intel® Project Amber Go Client Library is a beta version of Go Library for integrating with Intel® Project Amber V1 API. A beta version Intel® Project Amber Go TDX CLI (amber-cli) is provided in this library repository. This amber-cli provides basic functionality like create RSA key pair, get an Amber signed token, get a TD Quote with nonce and user data, and decrypt an encrypted blob. This section will introduce the installation and example usages.

#### 4.4.2 Installation

A build script is provided by tdx-tools, please refer to chapter 2.4.1 Build Packages to build packages and chapter 2.5.1 Install Packages to set up the repository.

*NOTE: This package is only for TD guests, and please make sure the attestation environment has been set up following previous steps.*

- Install the Amber Client package and its dependency
  - For Ubuntu 22.04
    ```bash
    $ sudo apt install -y libtdx-attest amber-cli
    ```
  - For RHEL 8.x
    ```bash
    $ sudo dnf install libtdx-attest intel-mvp-amber-cli
    ```

---

7 [https://github.com/intel/amber-client](https://github.com/intel/amber-client)
4.4.3 Example Usage

To get the TD Quote, a nonce and user data can be used as input parameter.

- Get a TD Quote
  
  ```
  $ amber-cli quote
  ```

- Get a TD Quote with nonce
  
  ```
  $ amber-cli quote --nonce <base64 encoded nonce>
  ```

- Get a TD Quote with nonce and user data
  
  ```
  $ amber-cli quote --nonce <base64 encoded nonce> --user-data <base64 encoded userdata>
  ```

To get an Amber signed token, the AMBER_URL and AMBER_API_KEY is needed, please contact Intel® Project Amber team to get them.

- Export environment variables
  
  ```
  $ export AMBER_URL=<amber api url>
  $ export AMBER_API_KEY=<amber attestation api key>
  ```

- Create RSA key pair
  
  ```
  $ amber-cli create-key-pair --key-path <private key file path>
  ```

- Get an Amber signed token
  
  ```
  $ amber-cli token
  ```

- Get an Amber signed token with user data and policy-ids
  
  ```
  $ amber-cli token --user-data <base64 encoded userdata> --policy-ids <comma separated amber attestation policy ids>
  ```

The amber-cli provides a feature to decrypt an encrypted blob, the encrypted blob should be encoded by base64.

```
$ amber-cli decrypt --key-path <private key file path> --in <base64 encoded encrypted blob> --out <output file path>
```
5 Validation

5.1 Overview

Linux Stack for Intel TDX provides end to end TDX capability across diverse infrastructures like hypervisor and Kubernetes within hypervisor.

![Validation Diagram](image)

Figure 22 Intel TDX E2E Full Stack Validation

The end-to-end validation of Linux Stack for Intel TDX covers the scopes in Table 6:

### Table 6 Linux Stack for Intel TDX Validations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validation</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System Status</td>
<td>IaaS</td>
<td>Verify the hardware and BIOS status like Intel SGX, Intel TME-MK, Intel TDX, Intel TDX SEAM module, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IaaS Host</td>
<td>IaaS</td>
<td>Verify the functionality of IaaS components like platform registration, QGS service, libvirt and QEMU configurations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VM Lifecycle</td>
<td>PaaS</td>
<td>Diverse boot types for TD VM guest, pre-boot environment measurement, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VM Environment</td>
<td>PaaS</td>
<td>CPUID, TSC, VirtIO devices, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workload</td>
<td>PaaS</td>
<td>Container workloads run in TD guest or the Kubernetes cluster within TD guest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To support complex validation and automation scenarios, the pyCloudStack framework is designed to support the scopes mentioned in Table 6 Linux Stack for Intel TDX Validations.

## 5.2 PyCloudStack

### 5.2.1 Overview

PyCloudStack abstracts the common objects, operations, and resources for diverse cloud architectures like hypervisor stack based on libvirt or direct QEMU commands, container stack orchestrated by Kubernetes or direct docker commands, and running on local or remote IaaS hosts. It can be used to create advance deployment CI/CD operator via Python plugin for ansible, end-to-end validation framework with customized components and configurations in a full vertical stack.

The overall architecture diagram is illustrated as below:

![PyCloudStack Framework Diagram](image-url)

*Figure 23 PyCloudStack Framework*
The framework supports scenarios for VM management: via QEMU direct or via libvirt:

- Scenarios 1: QEMU manage VM directly via QMP (QEMU monitor protocol)\(^9\)
- Scenarios 2: Libvirt manage VM via VirtAPI\(^{10}\)

The framework abstracts the common operations for host, virtual machine, kubernetes, and container:

More specifics for VM use case:

- VMGuestFactory is designed to communicate and handle VM configurations with test cases. For example, you can specify the size of a virtual machine by indicating how many CPUs and how much memory are required. “VMGuestFactory” usually works with “VMParam” and “VMImage”.

---

\(^9\) [https://wiki.qemu.org/Documentation/QMP](https://wiki.qemu.org/Documentation/QMP)
\(^{10}\) [https://github.com/virtapi/virtapi](https://github.com/virtapi/virtapi)
“VMParam” operator provides predefined VM parameters for typical configuration. It also provides the capability for you to customize VM parameters.

“VMImage” is designed to manage guest images for guest VMs so that multiple guest distros can be supported. You can customize guest images based on test requirement.

- “VMM” operators are responsible for VM lifecycle management using given configuration. VMM operator includes “VMMLibvirt” and “VMMQEMU”. “VMMLibvirt” needs to work together with “virtXML” operator.
- “virtXML” is responsible for Libvirt XML template management. It helps you to customize XML template for VMs.

For Kubernetes use case:

- “cluster” operator is designed to implement Kubernetes object management. “Registry” is used to manage container images. With them working together, you can create Kubernetes objects, such as deployment and service. Then cloud workload can run in a Kubernetes cluster.

There are also some other common operators for “Device management” at the bottom of the diagram.

- “CMDRunner” is designed to run commands on local host or remote targets via ssh connection.
- “DUT” is designed to manage devices under test, such as CPU frequency of host.
- “MSR” operator provides methods to read and write register.

Finally, with PyCloudStack framework, functionality, stability, performance, and interoperability tests are well supported.

### 5.2.2 Installation

PyCloudStack has been uploaded to [PyPI](https://pypi.org).

Install PyCloudStack via the following command.

```bash
$ pip3 install pycloudstack
```
5.2.3 Example

Most of automation tests in the tdx-tools repo are based on the PyCloudStack framework. Here are several examples:

- **Example 1: Operate VM via Libvirt**

```python
from pyc Cloudstack.vmguest import VMGuestFactory
from pyc Cloudstack.vmparam import VM_STATE_SHUTDOWN, VM_STATE_RUNNING,
 VM_STATE_PAUSE, VM_TYPE_TD

vm_factory = VMGuestFactory(vm_image, vm_kernel)

LOG.info("Create TD guest")
inst = vm_factory.new_vm(VM_TYPE_TD, auto_start=True)
inst.wait_for_ssh_ready()

LOG.info("Suspend TD guest")
inst.suspend()
ret = inst.wait_for_state(VM_STATE_PAUSE)
assert ret, "Suspend timeout"

LOG.info("Resume TD guest")
inst.resume()
ret = inst.wait_for_state(VM_STATE_RUNNING)
assert ret, "Resume timeout"
```

- **Example 2: Customize the VM**

```python
import logging
import psutil
# Get host total cores and sockets, assign 80% vcpu and 80% memory to vm
total_core = psutil.cpu_count()
cores = int(total_core * 0.4)
memsize = int(psutil.virtual_memory().available / 1000 * 0.8)
vmspec = VMSpec(sockets=2, cores=cores, memsize=memsize)
inst = vm_factory.new_vm(VM_TYPE_TD, vmspec=vmspec, auto_start=True)
```

- **Example 3: Run TensorFlow AI microbench boosted by AMX within TDVM**

```python
LOG.info("Create TD guest to test tensorflow")
td_inst = vm_factory.new_vm(vm_type, vmspec=VMSpec.model_large())

# customize the VM image
td_inst.image.inject_root_ssh_key(vm_ssh_pubkey)

# create and start VM instance
td_inst.create()
td_inst.start()
td_inst.wait_for_ssh_ready()

# It may take up to 30 minutes to complete the test
LOG.info("====== The test running may take up to 30 minutes! ======")
```
5.3 Intel TDX Tests

Intel TDX tests from tdx-tools are designed to cover basic acceptance tests, functionality, workload, and environment tests for Intel TDX. It also provides interoperability tests by using AMX in Intel TDX guest VM.

NOTE: The tests implementation depends on PyCloudStack framework. The tests execution must be on an Intel TDX-enabled Linux platform with an Intel TDX-enabled kernel, QEMU, Libvirt installed.

NOTE: Please make sure to use the correct tag of tdx-tools which matches the release version so that the tests can work with different Intel TDX kernel and Intel TDX QEMU versions.

5.3.1 Overview

The tests can be classified into 4 categories – Lifecycle, Environment, Workload and Interoperability. Please check tests list in below table. Some of the tests requires to customize guest image before running tests. Please refer to corresponding item in “Chapter 5.3.2 Prerequisite”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test case</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Prerequisite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 7 TDX Stack Tests
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Name</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>test_tdvm_lifecycle.py</td>
<td>Lifecycle</td>
<td>Use virsh to create/start/shutdown/suspend a VM guest including non-confidential VM and TD VM.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_multiple_tdvm.py</td>
<td>Lifecycle</td>
<td>Co-existence of multiple TD guest VMs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_vm_coexists.py</td>
<td>Lifecycle</td>
<td>Check TDVM and legacy VM co-existence</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_max_cpu.py</td>
<td>Lifecycle</td>
<td>Check TDVM boot with 80% host CPU utilization</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_vm_shutdown_mode.py</td>
<td>Lifecycle</td>
<td>Check TDVM shutdown mode via Libvirt</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_acpi_reboot.py</td>
<td>Lifecycle</td>
<td>Check ACPI reboot in TDVM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_acpi_shutdown.py</td>
<td>Lifecycle</td>
<td>Check ACPI shutdown in TDVM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_vm_shutdown_qga.py</td>
<td>Lifecycle</td>
<td>Check VM shutdown via QEMU guest agent</td>
<td>#1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_vm_reboot_qga.py</td>
<td>Lifecycle</td>
<td>Check VM reboot via QEMU guest agent</td>
<td>#1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_tdvm_tsc.py</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Check TDX guest TSC clock source and frequency</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_tdx_guest_status.py</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Check TDX initialization in TD guest</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_tdx_host_status.py</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Check Intel TME-MK, Intel TDX, Intel SGX, SEAMRR in host</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_tdvm_network.py</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Check network functions in TDVM</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_workload.redis.py</td>
<td>Workload</td>
<td>Redis workload running in TDVM</td>
<td>#2, #3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_workload.nginx.py</td>
<td>Workload</td>
<td>Nginx workload running in TDVM</td>
<td>#2, #3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_amx_docker_tf.py</td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Run AI model mobilenetv1_bf16 with AMX acceleration in docker container on TDVM</td>
<td>#2, #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_amx_vm_tf.py</td>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>Run AI model dien_bf16 with AMX acceleration in TDVM</td>
<td>#5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A full example for a workload test case – redis is as follows.

```python
def test_tdvm_redis(vm_factory, vm_ssh_pubkey, vm_ssh_key):
    
    Run redis benchmark test
    Ref: https://redis.io/topics/benchmarks
```

Document Number: 355388-001
Use official docker images redis:latest

Test Steps:
1. start VM
2. Run remote command "systemctl status docker" to check docker service's status
3. Run remote command "systemctl start docker" to force start docker service
4. Run remote command "/root/bat-script/redis-bench.sh" to launch redis container and benchmark testing

```python
LOG.info("Create TD guest to run redis benchmark")
td_inst = vm_factory.new_vm(VM_TYPE_TD)

# customize the VM image
    td_inst.image.inject_root_ssh_key(vm_ssh_pubkey)
    td_inst.image.copy_in(os.path.join(CURR_DIR, "redis-bench.sh"), "/root/"

# create and start VM instance
    td_inst.create()
    td_inst.start()
    td_inst.wait_for_ssh_ready()

command_list = [ 
    'systemctl start docker', 
    '/root/redis-bench.sh -t get,set'
]

for cmd in command_list:
    LOG.debug(cmd)
    runner = td_inst.ssh_run(cmd.split(), vm_ssh_key)
    assert runner.retcode == 0, "Failed to execute remote command"
```

### 5.3.2 Prerequisite

Guest image is required for all the tests. Please refer to “Chapter 2.4.2 Create Guest Image” to generate basic guest image. Additional prerequisite is required for some of the tests. Please check prerequisite of each test and take corresponding action as follows. Please start a VM using your guest image and go through corresponding items required by tests. Then shutdown the VM and use the guest image for further tests.

1. Install Qemu guest agent in guest image.

   For Ubuntu 22.04 guest image:
   ```
   $ sudo apt-get install qemu-guest-agent
   ```

   For RHEL 8.x guest image:
   ```
   $ sudo dnf install qemu-guest-agent
   ```
2. Install docker in guest image.

   For Ubuntu 22.04 guest image:

   
   ```
   $ sudo apt-get install docker.io
   ```

   For RHEL 8.x guest image:

   ```
   $ sudo dnf install docker
   ```

3. For workload tests, make sure the latest docker image is in guest image. It needs docker image “nginx:latest” and “redis:latest”.

   ```
   $ docker pull nginx:latest
   $ docker pull redis:latest
   ```


   For ubuntu 22.04 guest image:

   ```
   $ pip3 install intel-tensorflow-avx512==2.1.0
   $ wget https://storage.googleapis.com/intel-optimized-tensorflow/models/v2_5_0/dien_bf16_pretrained_opt_model.pb
   ```

   For RHEL 8.x guest image, please upgrade python to python 3.8 first and then run the following command in guest image:

   ```
   $ pip3 install intel-tensorflow-avx512==2.1.0
   $ wget https://storage.googleapis.com/intel-optimized-tensorflow/models/v2_5_0/dien_bf16_pretrained_opt_model.pb
   ```

5.3.3 Setup Environment

1. Install required packages:

   If your host distro is RHEL 8.x:

   ```
   $ sudo dnf install python3-virtualenv python3-libvirt libguestfs-devel libvirt-devel python3-devel gcc gcc-c++
   ```

   If your host distro is Ubuntu 22.04:

   ```
   $ sudo apt install python3-virtualenv python3-libvirt libguestfs-dev libvirt-dev python3-dev net-tools
   ```
2. Make sure libvirt service is started. If not, start libvirt service. If your host is Ubuntu 22.04 and AppArmor is enabled, please set `security_driver = "none"` in `/etc/libvirt/qemu.conf` and restart the libvirt service.

```bash
$ sudo systemctl status libvirtd
$ sudo systemctl start libvirtd
```

3. Setup environment. Run below command to setup the python environment.

```bash
$ cd tdx-tools/tests/
$ source setupenv.sh
```

4. Generate artifacts.yaml

Please refer to tdx-tools/tests/artifacts.yaml.template and generate tdx-tools/tests/artifacts.yaml. Update source and sha256sum to indicate the location of guest image and guest kernel.

5. Generate keys

Generate a pair of keys that will be used in test running.

```bash
$ ssh-keygen
```

The keys should be named "vm_ssh_test_key" and "vm_ssh_test_key.pub" and located under tdx-tools/tests/tests/

### 5.3.4 Run Tests

1. Run all tests:

```bash
$ sudo ./run.sh -s all
```

**NOTE:** "sudo" is required since some tests need root permission. And the user needs to be added into libvirt group. e.g., for user "root", please run `sudo usermod -aG libvirt root`.

2. Run some case modules:

```bash
$ ./run.sh -c <test_module1> -c <test_module2>
```

For example, run whole test module "test_tdvm_lifecycle.py"

```bash
$ ./run.sh -c tests/test_tdvm_lifecycle.py
```

3. Run specific test cases:

```bash
$ ./run.sh -c <test_module1> -c <test_module1>::<test_name>
```
For example, run test case “test_tdvm_lifecycle_virsh_start_shutdown” in “tests/test_tdvm_lifecycle.py”

```
$ ./run.sh -c tests/test_tdvm_lifecycle.py:: test_tdvm_lifecycle_virsh_start_shutdown
```

4. User can specify guest image OS type with “-g”. Currently it supports “rhel”, and “ubuntu”. RHEL 8.x guest image will be used by default if “-g” is not specified.

For example, run all tests using Ubuntu 22.04 guest image.

```
$ sudo ./run.sh -g ubuntu -s all
```
6 Develop & Debug

6.1 Override the Intel TDX SEAM module

Secure arbitration mode (SEAM) is an extension to the virtual machines extension (VMX) architecture to define a new, VMX root operation called SEAM VMX root and a new VMX non-root operation called SEAM VMX non-root. Collectively, the SEAM VMX root and SEAM VMX non-root execution modes are called operations in SEAM. SEAM VMX root operation is designed to host a CPU-attested, software module called the Intel® Trust-Domain Extensions (Intel® TDX) module to manage virtual machine (VM) guests called Trust Domains (TD). Currently, the Intel TDX Module is the only SEAM module that the Intel P-SEAMLDR installs [1].

By default, BIOS loads the built-in version of SEAMLDR and TDX module from the IFWI during the server booting. For development or debugging purpose, a new or debug version SEAMLDR and TDX module could be placed into the ESP partition. The BIOS loads the new or debug version from ESP on the next boot.

![Diagram showing BIOS search for TDX module from ESP](image)

The naming rule is:

1. `<ESP>/EFI/TDX/TDX-SEAM_SEAMLDR.bin`
- `<ESP>/EFI/TDX/TDX-SEAM.so`
- `<ESP>/EFI/TDX/TDX-SEAM.so.sigstruct`

Check the updated TDX module information

```
$ sudo cat /sys/firmware/tdx/tdx_module/*
```
6.2 Off-TD Debug via GDB from the Host

QEMU supports working with gdb via gdb’s remote-connection facility (the “gdbstub”). This allows you to debug guest code in the same way that you might do with a low-level debug facility like JTAG on real hardware. You can stop and start the virtual machine, examine states like registers and memory, and set breakpoints and watchpoints. Refer to https://www.qemu.org/docs/master/system/gdb.html for detail gdb usage.

To support gdb use, Intel TDX module exposes APIs:

- TDH.VP.RD/WR to allow QEMU emulator to read/write guest’s CPU states.
- TDH.MEM.RD/WR to allow QEMU emulator to read/write guest memory.

Steps to debug TD guest are as follows:

- Step 1: Start TD guest in debug mode
  - Append “debug=on” to “-object”. For example:
    ```
    -object tdx-guest,id=tdx,debug=on
    ```
  - Add -s -S parameter to qemu-kvm. For example:
    ```
    $ qemu-kvm -s -S
    ```
  - Disable kernel address randomization by append “nokaslr”
• Step 2: Install guest kernel’s debug symbol into host. For example:

```
$ sudo dnf install intel-mvp-tdx-guest-kernel-debuginfo
```

• Step 3: Run the script `start_gdb.sh` with following content

```
#!/bin/bash
GDB=gdb
MOD_DIR=/usr/lib/debug/usr/lib/modules/<guest kernel>/
$GDB \
  -ex "add-auto-load-safe-path $MOD_DIR" \ 
  -ex "file $MOD_DIR/vmlinux" \ 
  -ex "set arch i386:x86-64:intel" \ 
  -ex "set remotetimeout 360" \ 
  -ex "target remote 127.0.0.1:1234"
```

• Step 4: In the GDB console, use command “hb” to set the first break point. For example

```
gdb> hb start_kernel
```

The software breakpoint is available after the kernel is loaded into GPA space by QEMU.
6.3 Check Memory Encryption

There are lots of approaches to check whether TDX memory is encrypted or not. This section introduces how to do this check via GDB debug approach.

1. Install kernel development package on the host for debug symbol (using RHEL distro as example):

```bash
$ sudo dnf install intel-mvp-tdx-kernel-devel
```

2. Get GVA (guest virtual address) of the .text code section of guest kernel

```bash
$ # Extract the guest kernel binary
$ /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/extract-vmlinux <path to guest kernel file> vmlinux
$ objdump -d vmlinux > disassembled-vmlinux.asm && head -n 20 disassembled-vmlinux.asm

...  
ffffff81000000 <.text>:  
ffffff81000000: 48 8d 25 51 3f c0 01 lea 0x1c03f51(%rip),%rsp  
ffffff81000007: 48 8d 3d f2 ff ff ff lea -0xe(%rip),%rdi  
ffffff8100000e: 56 push %rsi  
ffffff8100000f: e8 dc 06 00 00 callq 0xffffffff810006f0
```

The result shows that the virtual address of .text section start from 0xffffffff81000000.

3. Verify the instructions/memory at guest physical address of .text code section in non-confidential VM guest
   ➢ Launch a non-confidential guest, nokaslr should be appended for kernel command like below

   ```bash
   -append "root=/dev/vda1 console=hvc0 nokaslr"
   ```
   ➢ Enter QEMU monitor shell
     If using start-qemu.sh, just “telnet 127.0.0.1 9001”
   ➢ Disassemble the virtual address of .text section

```bash
(qemu) stop
(qemu) x /10i 0xffffffff81000000  
0x01000000: 48 8d 25 51 3f c0 01 leaq 0x1c03f51(%rip),%rsp  
0x01000007: 48 8d 3d f2 ff ff ff leaq -0xe(%rip),%rdi  
0x0100000e: 56 push %rsi  
0x0100000f: e8 dc 06 00 00 callq 0x10006f0
```

4. Verify the instructions/memory at guest physical address of .text code section in TD guest
   ➢ Launch a TD guest
- debug=on should be append for QEMU command line

- object tdx-guest,id=tdx,debug=on

- nkaslr should be appended for kernel command line

-append "root=/dev/vda1 console=hvc0 nokaslr"

➢ Enter QEMU monitor shell

If using start-qemu.sh, just “telnet 127.0.0.1 9001”

➢ Disassemble the virtual address of .text section

(qemu) stop
(qemu) x /10i 0xffffffff81000000

0xffffffff81000000:  98  cwtl
0xffffffff81000001:  f8  clc
0xffffffff81000002:  49 5e  popq  %r14
0xffffffff81000004:  5a  popq  %rdx
0xffffffff81000005:  55  pushq %rbp
...

The disassembled instructions should be different from non-confidential, meaningless since the memory is encrypted.

6.4 Run Intel AMX workload within TDX Guest

Intel AMX is a new built-in accelerator that improves the performance of deep-learning training and inference on the CPU. This is ideal for workloads like natural-language processing, recommendation systems, and image recognition. It is available on the 4th Gen Intel® Xeon® Scalable processors. Use the following approach to check its capability on the host server and TD guest:

```bash
$ grep -o amx /proc/cpuinfo
```

Expect to see output of several "amx". Empty results mean Intel AMX is not enabled.

This section introduces how to run AI workload boosted by Intel AMX within Intel TDX guest:

- Install the Intel® Optimization for TensorFlow* version 2.8.0 via pip. Python versions supported are 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10. For TensorFlow versions 1.13, 1.14 and 1.15 with pip > 20.0, if you get an “invalid wheel error”, try to downgrade the pip version to < 20.0

```bash
$ dnf install python3.8
$ pip3.8 install intel-tensorflow-avx512==2.8.0
```

---

1) Intel® Advanced Matrix Extensions Overview
Download pre-trained model

```bash
$ wget https://storage.googleapis.com/intel-optimized-tensorflow/models/v1_8/mobilenet_v1_1.0_224_frozen.pb
```

Clone the intelai/models repo and then navigate to the benchmark’s directory

```bash
$ dnf install git
$ git clone https://github.com/IntelAI/models.git
$ cd models/benchmarks
```

Set environment variables

```bash
$ export DNNL_MAX_CPU_ISA=AVX512_CORE_AMX
$ export OMP_NUM_THREADS=16
$ export KMP_AFFINITY=granularity=fine,verbose,compact
```

Run online inference. Replace `<PATH>` to the absolute path where pre-trained model is located

```bash
$ python3.8 launch_benchmark.py \
  --benchmark-only --framework tensorflow --model-name mobilenet_v1 \
  --in-graph /opt/mobilenet_v1_1.0_224_frozen.pb \
  --mode inference --precision bfloat16 --batch-size 1 \n  --num-intra-threads 16 --num-inter-threads 1 --verbose \n  --input_height=224 --input_width=224 \n  --warmup_steps=20 --steps=20 \n  --input_layer='input' \n  --output_layer='MobilenetV1/Predictions/Reshape_1'
```

The expected result should look like below:

```
[Running warmup steps...]
steps = 10, 360.33539518900346 images/sec steps = 20, 349.292471685543 images/sec
[Running benchmark steps...]
steps = 10, 364.1521097412745 images/sec steps = 20, 369.8028566390407 images/sec
Average Throughput: 364.37 images/s on 20 iterations
```

If running same workload without “export DNNL_MAX_CPU_ISA=AVX512_CORE_AMX”, the result will be smaller (images/sec) without AMX boost.

**NOTE:** If you fail to run above commands and see a message like “If you cannot immediately regenerate your protos, some other possible workarounds are: 1. Downgrade the protobuf package to 3.20.x or lower. 2. Set PROTOCOL_BUFFERS_PYTHON_IMPLEMENTATION=python (but this will use pure-Python parsing and will be much slower).” you can either upgrade protobuf version to 3.20.0 as following:

```bash
$ pip3.8 install --upgrade protobuf==3.20.0
```
or set environment variable as following

```bash
$ export PROTOCOL_BUFFERS_PYTHON_IMPLEMENTATION=python
```

Then re-run above online inference command.
7 Disclaimer

The released components of the Linux Reference Stack for Intel TDX: Virtual Firmware (edk2/TDVF), bootloader (grub2), and the Linux kernel, are fully enabled to be run from within the Linux-based Intel TDX Guest VM to take advantage of the Intel TDX security technology for cryptographically isolating Trusted VMs from the rest of the system.

While Intel TDX removes the need for a Guest VM to trust the host and virtual machine manager (VMM), it cannot by itself protect the guest VM from host/VMM attacks that leverage existing paravirt-based communication interfaces between the host/VMM and the guest (such as MMIO, portIO, etc.). To achieve the full protection against such attacks, the Guest VM SW stack needs to be hardened to securely handle a untrusted and potentially malicious input from a host/VMM via the above-mentioned interfaces. This hardening effort is not specific to Intel TDX as a technology, but common for all confidential cloud computing solutions and the components of the VM guest SW stack. It should be an industry-wide effort together with the open source maintainers to perform the security analysis and hardening of these components for the confidential computing threat model.

The Linux Reference Stack for Intel TDX team has invested a significant effort in hardening the Linux kernel that is released as part of the Linux Reference Stack for Intel TDX. The threat model for the Linux guest kernel, as well as the implemented mitigation mechanisms are explained in the Intel TDE Linux guest kernel security specification. The overall hardening methodology, as well as documentation on the tools that have been used can be found in Intel TDE guest Linux kernel hardening strategy. As a result, the Linux Reference Stack for Intel TDX kernel tree contains numerous patches that either implement these hardening mechanisms or fix the security issues that were discovered during the hardening process. It is strongly recommended that all these patches are manually carried forward to the intended production kernels, until they are merged into the mainline Linux kernel and will become part of the upstream base kernel tree. In particular, the following two patches that are critical for the security of the Intel TDX Linux guest kernel must be included in any production guest kernel:

Commit ID:
- c942fc241d4e6c215731b6f03740b1a8bfc42018 (Patch No. 0421) from patches-tdx-kernelMVP-KERNEL-5.19-v2.4.tar.gz
Commit ID: c289330c56c61508a1008d74fc65b7bc24a4a7d5 (Patch No. 0422) from patches-tdx-kernelMVP-KERNEL-5.19-v2.4.tar.gz

It is important to note that the hardening of the Linux guest kernel has not been finalized for this release and other components, such as virtual firmware (edk2/TDVF) and the bootloader (grub2), still need more attention. In particular, the existing interfaces that edk2/TDVF or grub2 expose towards the host/VMM have not yet been analyzed for potential security implications against the confidential cloud computing threat model. It is strongly recommended that this analysis be done, and any issues uncovered are mitigated before these components are used in production.
8 References


